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The Effects of Financial Crises on Developing Countries 
Prof. Bintang Yudhistira 
Abstract 
In ten years, emerging countries have moved from net borrowers to net lenders. At the root of the 
1997-98 financial crisis, they became collateral victims of the 2007-08 crisis that erupted in the 
United States and Europe, after having withstood relatively well at first. This article proposes an 
analysis of the repositioning of emerging countries in the global financial sphere on two levels. 
This concerns, on the one hand, institutional representativeness vis-à-vis the industrialized 
countries, the IMF and, on the other hand, the role of emerging countries in the context of a 
contagious financial crisis. In this sense, the article raises the question of the coupling or the 
decoupling of the economic cycles of the emerging countries with those of the industrialized 
countries, in an environment of financial interconnection. Indeed, this 2008 crisis will appear as 
a shock common to emerging countries from a financial point of view, while the Asian crises of 
1997-98 were not triggered by common shocks. But the economic decoupling hypothesis has yet 
to be verified: everything will depend on the depth of the US recession and the continued 
strength of domestic demand in emerging economies. 
After the financial crises they were responsible for in the 1990s, emerging countries received, 
during the first half of the 2000s, many qualifiers concerning their place in the international 
financial sphere: tipping of financial power, rebalancing, repositioning, because of the constant 
maintenance of higher economic growth developed countries, improving their fundamentals 
from 2002-2003, of their change of borrower status net lender, as well as the accumulated 
amount of foreign exchange reserves over the last years. Their resistance, at first, to the 2007-
2008 crisis, born on the stock markets and the money markets Americans and Europeans, 
stressed again their economic strength and financial. Statements by Heads of State and 
Government emerging markets, in previous months and during the G20 November 15, 2008, 
April 2, 2009 and September 24 to 25, 2009, are only a reflection of their newfound legitimacy 
and their need to recognition by industrialized countries and international institutions like the 
IMF. Their demand for a better representativeness in these institutions can no longer be rejected, 
any more than that, formulated during the G20, to lead international institutions in the future But 
from August 2008 to September 2008, emerging countries have collateral victims, by different 
mechanisms of transmission, of the crisis in the United States and Europe. These are the first 
emerging markets and currencies that have been affected and then the real economy. The crisis 
of 2008, the recession in the industrialized countries will they be a common shock for emerging 
countries? In how will their business cycle be affected? If he is little affected, we can then talk 
about decoupling the business cycles of emerging countries with those of the industrialized 
countries or at least one emerging countries, which will accentuate their strength economic and 
their repositioning. 
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In any case, because of the progress made, the emerging economies must be reconsidered in the 
international financial sphere at two levels: on the one hand, their institutional representation, 
although this may take time, and secondly, their role within of a financial crisis. They are no 
longer the poorly managed, over-indebted countries of the 1990s, at the origin of a financial 
crisis. 
On July 2, 1997, Thailand devalued its national currency, does not more likely to face 
speculative attacks due to lack of reserves currency exchange. A currency crisis, a stock market 
crisis and a crisis banking on the national and international bank credit market, a "trinomial" of 
crises, burst. The sanction of the markets is then ruthless: an economy whose actors, banks and 
companies, are heavily indebted at the national level, but also international, can no longer 
function if external financing is cut (Cartapanis, 2004). 
An unexpected and contagious financial crisis In a context of euphoria, further liberalization 
financial sector, the private debt overhang of national economies, then in relation to foreign 
creditor banks, in particular Japanese for the Asian and American economies to Latin America, 
has been gradually established since 1993. The episode 1994 Mexican did not seriously disrupt 
the financing outside of Asian countries. Adverse selection, moral hazard, myopia disaster 
finally made Asian borrowers bad borrowers, borrowing funds with lower interest rates to abroad 
to invest in high-risk risky projects anticipated. No national supervision has been able to 
counteract these excessive behavior, with most Asian banks the Basel I ratio, for example. The 
fixed exchange rate, the intervention IMF in Latin America a few years ago and always strong 
financial returns, apparently decoupled from  those of the industrialized countries, encouraged 
foreign investors, international banks to invest in these economies. The loans international banks 
were overwhelmingly granted (end of 1996, $ 708bn in emerging markets - 57.7% in the short 
term - including $ 367bn to Asia and $ 242bn to Latin America). Since the moment when the 
external creditors realized not only the breathlessness of certain economic sectors, but also over-
indebtedness, they doubted the quality of the balance sheet of Asian banks, revised their 
perception of emerging market risk and withdrew their funds on the liabilities side especially 
banks, first by disengaging from Thailand 1997, followed by other Asian countries (Indonesia 
crisis in August 1997, in Korea in December 1997, in Malaysia in September 1998) and other 
emerging countries (Russia in August 1998, Brazil in January 1999), with more or less 
discrimination. The transmission from the crisis to other economies may have resulted from 
several factors (Brana and Lahet, 2005). On the one hand, countries close to Thailand in terms of 
fundamentals also suffered speculative attacks: this will be called the discriminating contagion 
that would have triggered crises very close chronologically to the Thai crisis (Kirrane 2017).  
On the other hand, a crisis can be triggered in a country emerging, following a crisis in another 
emerging country, as a result of the change in global perception of foreign investors on the 
emerging-country asset class, regardless of the actual state of health of the country: it is the pure 
contagion that would have explained the following crises. In any case, the transmission of the 
crisis has borrowed financial channel or that of the joint creditor of Kaminsky and Reinhart 
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(2000). Due to losses on Thailand, investors have redeveloped their portfolios of securities or 
loans and withdrawn their cash other emerging economies: an international liquidity crisis then 
takes shape on the basis of internal problems in emerging countries and the change in investor 
behavior towards them. 
Faced with the denial of Asian governments and their declarations virulent against speculators, 
the IMF has struggled to collect the attention of Asian countries. But the proposed financial 
rescues, first, to replenish foreign exchange reserves and maintain external payments, and 
secondly, to restructure savings, appeared necessary. Unprecedented amounts have lent ($ 35 
billion to Thailand, $ 57 billion to Korea), packaged rigorous adjustment programs. This 
conditionality then been much criticized, as well as the Washington Consensus on which it is 
based, the IMF having been made responsible for the recessions economic problems that hit 
countries in 1998 as a result of imposed.  
The IMF found itself at the center of virulent criticism about its action in Asia (too rigorous and 
inadequate reform plans, inability to anticipate and manage the crisis, moral hazard linked to its 
policy of support, no renewal of its mode of regulation), than about his missions in general. The 
IMF has been criticized for failing in its basic mission of financial aid to countries in difficulty 
temporary balance of payments and finally have put good number of emerging or developing 
countries under its supervision by undermining their representation (linked to the calculation of 
the country's debt to the IMF has been growing since years. This strong criticism, heard by the 
IMF, should not be forget that until then, no financial crisis could be managed without the 
massive intervention of the IMF and that sometimes some countries found the aid insufficient. In 
addition, the IMF recalled that provided only a part of the external financing needed for country, 
the rest being allocated by private lenders, encouraged precisely in this sense by the presence of 
the IMF. The latter, despite the criticisms, appears as a privileged creditor in times of crisis to 
calm the panic of investors, a lender of last resort international and a catalyst for other types of 
financing. 
Meltzer proposed to refocus IMF missions on aid temporarily to financially sound countries has 
found some resonance in the time and, finally, will be brought up to date in 2009. In September 
1997, a unanimous decision gave a mandate to the IMF to confront and monitor financial 
transactions, but the crisis 1997 and the euphoria returned, this reform was not implemented 
because it was quite restrictive for governments. 
Since 2002-2003, the reforms put in place have begun to effect. Emerging countries, particularly 
Asian ones, have since 1998, to put in place economic and structural reforms, clean up their 
banking system, improve the supervision of financial systems, prudential regulation, to reform 
local financial markets, which had not been done in the years 1990 despite the financial 
liberalization initiated in the late 1980s. Economic growth comes back with investor confidence. 
Emerging countries contribute 75% to global growth and their own growth averages 7% over 
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2003-2007, with China 10.5%, India 8.9%, Thailand 5%, Korea South 5.2%, Brazil and Mexico 
3.4%, Poland 4.8%, Turkey 7.5%. 
Capital flows are returning to the path of emerging countries since 2003 (BIS, 2004 and 2008): $ 
57 billion in net capital inflows in 2001 for all emerging countries to $ 171 billion in 2003, with 
$ 31 billion in Asia and $ 111 billion, respectively, for Latin America by $ 3 billion and $ 16 
billion, and Eastern Europe from $ 10 billion and $ 43 billion. They remain the preferred 
destination for capital of foreign investors, which ultimately makes the Asian crisis pause in the 
external financing of emerging countries. 
This massive return of capital could be explained by conditions advantageous monetary 
instruments in the industrialized countries, fueling abundant liquidity that has been invested in 
more savings strong growth and with returns from those of industrialized countries, as before the 
crisis of 1997, which gave place to carry trade strategies. Capital inflows have also could be 
impacted by improving the fundamentals of the countries emerging, visible in the increase in 
ratings from 2003 to 2006. 
Stock indices are back, currencies are starting to reevaluate and foreign exchange reserves 
accumulate to levels unprecedented: at the end of 2007, they reached $ 1,500 billion in China, $ 
491bn in Russia, $ 275bn in Taiwan, $ 262bn in Korea, $ 301bn in India, $ 206 billion in Brazil, 
$ 100 billion in Thailand, $ 79 billion in Mexico, $ 24bn in Hungary, $ 33bn in the Czech 
Republic. 
Countries, especially in Latin America, strengthen the depth their local financial market and 
issue debt securities in national currency, as in Brazil in September 2006, which issues an 
international obligation in real for an equivalent amount at $ 745 million and for a maturity of 
fifteen years. Sovereign spreads lower, reflecting investor confidence and the return of these 
savings in investment strategies: for example, Brazil earns investment grade and 178 global 
funds invest emerging markets in 2007 compared with 77 in 2002. 
Gross inflows are strong, but as the outflows of capital are becoming so gradually, data on net 
flows end up not making much sense anymore, which is very different from the period before the 
Asian crisis. These capital outflows two dimensions: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) made by 
emerging countries and the increase since 2000 of South-South and sometimes intra-regional 
FDI (the share of FDI emerging countries in FDI to emerging countries is from 20% in 1995 to 
40% in 2007); accumulation of reserves foreign exchange, in connection with the return of 
countries in commerce and finance international and with the massive purchases by the Asian 
world of US Treasury bonds, through the creation or expansion of the role emerging sovereign 
wealth funds that manage budget surpluses, or the foreign exchange reserves of their country. 
The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves seems to immunize these countries against all 
attacks speculative or exogenous shocks and allowed them to restructure their economy (China 
has punctuated its reserves to restructure four banks in 2006), which clears them of any request 
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for IMF. It is clear that the favorable global economic situation over the period not created 
opportunity for IMF support but accumulation foreign exchange reserves can be analyzed as a 
strategy for pass from him, to find a financial power and this independence sought after, leaving 
the latter in a questioning of since 2006.  
In addition, sovereign wealth funds have been created in emerging countries and have become 
formidable investors, creating debates and bringing back protectionist impulses strategic sectors 
in the discourse of the industrialized countries (Coeuré, 2008; Dockès, 2009; Kern, 2009). The 
amount of their commitments estimated at $ 3 billion from $ 2,000 billion in 2007, and it is 
estimated that financial weight in 2015 at $ 10,000 billion (IFSL, 2008). Since 2000, 20 new 
funds were founded by new actors from of the emerging world, including 12 since 2005. For 
example: China Investment Corporation (CIC) in September 2007 ($ 200 billion in assets 
managed), Russian Stabilization Fund in 2004 ($ 130bn), Korea Investment Corporation in 2005 
($ 20bn), Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) in 2005 ($ 50bn), the Oil Reserve Fund in 2005 in 
Libya ($ 50bn), National Development Fund in Venezuela in 2005 ($ 18 billion), Economic and 
Social Stabilization Fund in 2007 in Chile ($ 6bn). 
In the light of the crisis that began in August 2007 on the stock exchanges and the money 
markets of the industrialized countries, the emerging countries appear as important financial 
actors, remediated, but also as a heterogeneous set, or even a heterogeneous asset class. 
This term "emerging countries" includes countries restructured, with strong economic growth, 
but not all of which have the same position of current accounts, nor the same strength of the 
system banking. In addition, some are producers of raw materials and/or commodities (Russia, 
Brazil), others have focused their development on manufacturing production (China) or on 
services (India). The BRIC or BRICS  are more revealing of geopolitical symbols than of 
economic homogeneity. Moreover, this heterogeneity is valued as such by investors who 
discriminate emerging countries, this which is a progress compared to the precarious period of 
1997 (Odonnat and Rahmouni, 2006). 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 was not triggered in the emerging countries, nor by excessive 
behavior of emerging countries. If we believe the speeches of some heads of state and 
government of this group, it sounds like a revenge in relation to their financial history and their 
face repositioning industrialized countries. For one year, from August 2007 to August 2008, the 
emerging countries seemed to be spared by the crisis. Since August 2008-September 2008, their 
stock exchanges and currencies are affected. 
Even if the data are imperfect, it appeared that the banks emerging countries, rather deposit 
banks, have had little exposed to subprime securities. They therefore did not suffer the 
depreciations of assets, the activity of investment bank being the field of action branches or 
subsidiaries of foreign banks. Only big ones actors like Bank of China or ICICI in India recorded 
asset impairments. Moreover, even if bankers are more trained in risk management, the practices 
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of the country's banks industrialized countries are not yet theirs. Financial risks being less 
important, the distrust of investors was also vis-à-vis those countries. 
Interbank markets in local currency of emerging countries remained broadly stable. In the last 
half of 2007, emerging markets received capital leaving the industrialized countries, like a race 
to the shelter in high-yielding, relatively well-managed and non-accountable of the crisis. Thus, 
the stock markets and currencies have been impacted the increase, in particular on September 
2007-October 20 According to the BIS (Bank for International Settlements) (2008), in 2007, net 
inflows of private capital increased on average by more than 2 percentage points in Asia 
(reaching 3.5% of GDP regional level) and Latin America (2.9% of GDP) and 0.75 points 
percentage in the CEECs (9% of GDP). Gross entries in Asia were the most important: 50% of 
gross private capital channeled to emerging economies and 15% of regional GDP, one level 
close to the one before the crisis of 1997-1998. For Latin America, they represent 6% of GDP 
and 11% of the capital channeled, and for CEECs 20% of GDP and 28% of capital channeled. It 
is mainly portfolio investment (doubling from 2002 to 2007 to reach 20% of total capital flow) 
and bank loans transboundary levels (from almost 0% in 2002 to 40% in 2007 of the total capital 
flow), the share of FDI falling (from 90% to 40%). 
The CEECs received the largest share of bank loans (estimated at 32% of their aggregated GDP). 
Moreover, in the direction of capital outflow, participation of emerging sovereign wealth funds 
in foreign banks 2007 have also been indicative of the sound management of these economies 
and have accentuated the gap in vitality and power between industrialized countries and 
emerging countries. It is clear that contagion systemic would have been much stronger without 
that. From August 9, 2007 as at 15 January 2008, the sovereign wealth funds of China, Singapore 
and The Middle East recapitalized $ 80 billion financial problems in the United States and 
Europe In total, 12.7% of the capital of Citigroup, 23% of that Merill Lynch and 12% of UBS's 
are in the hands of sovereign wealth funds end of January 2008. In November 2008, the 
sovereign wealth funds of the Gulf acquired 31% of the capital of Barclays (of which 12.7% for 
QIA, the Qatar fund, and 16.3% for ADIA, the Abu Dhabi fund) to add to the 3% stake in CDB 
(China Development Bank) and 2.1% of Temasek in 2007. The sovereign funds emerged in 2008 
as if they were waiting – strategy of wait and see - that the prices of industrialized assets are still 
falling to buy them. Or did they make losses in 2007? In any case, 2008-2009, they suffered 
spectacular devaluation of their participation in foreign institutions (Marin, 2009, concerning 
CIC's investment in Blackstone), but are preparing for more important in the future. 
The resilience of emerging countries to the crisis and the sustained interest of investors held up 
until mid-2008 emerging markets overall, after the strong growth phase of stock market indexes, 
we notice two high points that come with of a phase of more or less strong investor confidence or 
more or less strong capital maintenance in emerging countries. This is the period from November 
2007 (first high point, December for the Emerging Europe zone) until August 2008: observes a 
relative instability of the index, without massive collapse, which will intervene from the end of 
August. For Latin America, the peak higher is established in May 2008. Compared to this period 
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of more or less strong hesitation investors, we see now, if we are interested in each country (see 
graphs 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d above), that there are differences in the evolution of stock market 
indices. Which can be interpreted as a sign of discrimination on the part of investors because 
there are disparities between economies, although since 2003 they have all improved their 
fundamentals. Indeed, for China, there is a sub-period - October 2007 to February 2008 - where 
the decline is more pronounced than that of the indices of the zones taken as a whole; then, there 
is a period of recovery / lull until the end of July 2008. For the Korea, after the peak of 
November 2007, there is a steady decline and progressive until August 2008. Investors appear to 
have less responsive and concerned about Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand: the high peak is 
observed later than for other Asian countries and emerging regions, respectively in February 
2008, January 2008, May 2008. Then, we find the degradation progressive indexes, less erratic, 
until August 2008. Even though their ratings are lower as well as their foreign exchange 
reserves, these three countries could appear to be less at risk economic and financial than the two 
big countries that are China and Korea, which have always been at the heart of the investment 
strategies of investors. In addition, the level of indebtedness of the private sector of the Korea is 
worrying because it is at the level of 1997; by elsewhere, this country has experienced the largest 
monetary depreciation of Asia area since 1998.  
Brazil also experienced a high peak in its stock market index late - May 2008 - and then 
gradually decline until August 2008. The concerns related to the crisis have affected it later. 
Mexico and Chile have both enjoyed a long period of upholding relative to the level of the stock 
market index, without a major peak, which is not the other emerging countries, a sign of steady 
and steady trust investors: from May 2007 (date of the first peak) to August 2008. The ratings of 
these countries are good, the Standard & Poor's ratings from Brazil and Chile increased in May 
2008 (BBB-) and January 2008 (A +). And despite current deficits, these countries have 
improved, in previous years, their economic and financial situation: increase in the level of 
foreign reserves, robustness of the system banking, development of the local bond market . Chile 
appears to be the strongest country because public debt is low and accumulated savings through 
the Copper Stabilization Fund is important.  
Moreover, like Brazil, it is less dependent on exports to the United States and the euro area 
because its exports Hungary and Poland show a similar downward trend their index: a high point 
in June 2007-July 2007, then a decline progressive until August 2008, already reflecting the 
perception of fundamental less healthy (current account deficit, foreign currency debt, interest 
rate savings, insufficient foreign exchange reserves compared to public debt, which is 
particularly strong in Hungary), even if Poland also has a higher peak in October 2007 (Kirrane 
2003).. In However, the Czech Republic, better managed and less concerned by the withdrawal 
of foreign bank loans from foreign banks in difficulty, maintained investor confidence until June 
2008, then the index gradually decreases until September 2008.  
In the impact phase, from August 2008-September 20084, investors, and in particular financial 
institutions overexposed to country assets emerging markets, considered risky, and given the 
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losses incurred markets of the industrialized countries, take their profits and withdraw more 
frankly than in the first part of 2008 their capital of emerging countries. This deleveraging results 
in depreciations monetary policy and the sharp decline in emerging stock market indices.  
Over the period August 2008-end of October 2008 (November 2008 for Indonesia), the countries 
surveyed all suffered index declines of at least 40%. The largest decreases concern Indonesia -
70%, Hungary -63%, Brazil -62%, Korea -60%, Mexico -58% and China -53%. 
The Brazilian Real is the currency that has depreciated the most September 2008 and November 
2008: 45%. Turkish currencies, Mexican, South African, South Korean, Thai and Indian also 
collapsed. Over the same period, the Moscow Stock Exchange plunged 69%. Countries are also 
affected by the drying up of markets bonds in September 2008-October 2008, even for 
companies and well-rated states, and even for currency bonds local level, which is a strong sign 
of lack of liquidity and risk aversion (Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico). Of Further stock market cuts 
come afterwards. The takeoff of emerging market emerging market funds reached $ 32.8 billion 
in September 2008 ($ 4.1 billion for Latin America, $ 15.6 billion for Asia excluding Japan), 
compared to a $ 20.6 billion collection in September 2007 ($ 8.2 billion for Latin America and $ 
9.7 billion for Asia excluding Japan) are diversified. 
Brazilian and Mexican currencies and stock markets are heavily affected, while these countries 
are not fragile, but they pay the improvement of the depth and liquidity of their markets. Brazil is 
also neglected, because it is a net exporter of raw materials whose prices are falling. Sovereign 
spreads also rose: for the EMBI Asia index emerging from 275 points to 600 points from July 
2008 to October 2008, and for EMBI Eastern Europe 250 points to 600 points (source: 
Datastream). 
Ratings of rating agencies are not adjusted too much downwards (see Table 1 above) because the 
withdrawal of capital is linked to the effects of postponement and not to frank degradation of the 
fundamentals due to internal problems in emerging countries. Standard & Poor's lowered notes 
from Argentina in October 2008 (B-) and from Russia in January 2009 (BBB) on the basis of 
identified concerns about fundamentals. Of Moreover, while the Czech Republic and Poland 
keep their rating since 2007 (A and A-), the rating of Hungary is degraded in May 2008 from 
BBB to BBB-. Overall, other countries retain their ratings and some see it increasing (China, 
Brazil, Chile). 
Emerging economies appear to have relatively well managed the impacts of the crisis, drawing 
on the foreign exchange reserves which remain important. Foreign exchange reserves Chinese 
imports continue to increase at the end of 2008 ($ 1.9 trillion), while Russia saw its share fall by 
14% in October 2008, India and Korea by 12%, Malaysia by 10%, Saudi Arabia by 18%, Mexico 
15%, for example. In any case, in May 2009-June 2009, they are at a very high level. 
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Risk aversion continued to penalize emerging countries until February 2009-March 2009, where 
stock indexes go back quite frankly. Depreciated emerging currencies are purchase opportunities 
and a sign of renewed competitiveness for country and therefore future growth. 
From February 2009 to the first week of September 2009, the increase stock market indexes was 
important, reflecting confidence found in emerging countries. In Asia, central banks have even 
had to intervene, in the face of capital inflows, to curb the appreciation of their currency. The rise 
in the stock market index was 58% in China, 72% in Korea, 55% in Thailand, 100% in Indonesia 
(a correction of the sharp decline recorded previously), 44% in Malaysia, 95% in Mexico, 80% 
in Brazil, 48% in Chile, 82% in Czech Republic, 95% in Poland, 146% in Hungary (Kirrane 
2003).. The strong rise in the CEECs is explained by the presence of financial support European 
organizations and the IMF, as in November 2008 in Hungary, and more specifically by the 
granting of the new facility for IMF credit, scalable, for healthy countries for a purpose 
preventive, which reassures investors, in May 2009 in Poland, as in Mexico in April 2009, which 
reinforces the image of this country and has repercussions on its neighbors whose previous 
efforts to modernize the economy and actions to emerge from the crisis in 2008 are rewarded: 
Chile, Brazil. 
Nevertheless, if the financial sphere seems to be restarted, the level of indices is still much lower 
than that of 2007-early 2008 corrections could also be made following the sharp rise observed, 
following the growth outlook announcements. Otherwise, it is clear that the decline in global 
demand for goods and that Commodity prices have impacted the real economy of these 
countries. For example, in February 2009, Mexico experienced a decline in automotive exports 
by 45% and, in May 2009, Korea suffered a 27% drop in its technology-related exports.  The 
decrease of at least 30% in the price of commodities, from July to December 2008, would cost 
two points growth in 2009 to Latin America. 
The fact that emerging countries are no longer at the origin of a crisis global impact, like the 
Mexican crisis 1994-1995 or the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, accentuates their economic 
performance and increases their financial power. They are guilt-free and it is with a certain calm 
that the leaders of these countries responded to external shocks. Their resistance, at first, the 
current crisis is also moving in this direction. They are actually more experienced, because of 
past crises legitimacy is found. 
For some years now, there has been a questioning of the order world, a shift in financial power, a 
rebalancing benefit of emerging countries which could be accentuated if the cycle The economic 
situation of these countries was decoupled from that of the industrialized countries. But concerns 
remain about them. 
The repositioning of emerging countries is at the same time industrialized countries which have 
become, for some, net borrowers of capital and which are at the origin of the current crisis, and 
with the IMF penalized by the decline in financial support to countries emerging. 
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In terms of political representation, the behavior of the countries of Latin America differs 
somewhat from that of emerging countries Asia. While the latter imposed themselves 
"discreetly" because of their stock of foreign exchange reserves, the evolution of the prices of 
certain of their currencies participating in global imbalances and investment capacity of their 
sovereign wealth funds, the first were more vocal in calling on the G20, the IMF, to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), representativeness that emerging countries deserve because of their 
economic results and, in 2007-2008, of their non-responsibility in the current crisis. 
The statements of the Brazilian Government, in October 2008, on the monitoring of 
industrialized countries that the IMF would do better to increase the show. In the context of the 
G20, emerging countries have finally spoken in the same voice, through that of Brazil, who 
presides over it, to demand that discussions on the regulation of global finance are done with 
them. Note that in September 2006, China, Turkey, Mexico and South Korea had already seen 
their share increase so in the IMF, to take into account their economic weight. 
Since October 2008, the real economy of the emerging countries seems nevertheless disturbed by 
the crisis, beyond the stock markets and currencies. 
China was one of the first countries to announce a recovery plan: November 9, 2008, a release 
before the end of 2010 of $ 585 billion for support the country's economic growth which has 
fallen to 9% third quarter of 2008. The magnitude is such that we have taken the measure, as of 
this date, the possible repercussions of the crisis on the world emerge. It's about active tax policy 
and demand support interior by major construction policies to counterbalance slowing economic 
growth and demand American and European, which for twenty years have been one of the 
driving forces of Chinese growth.re mature, Nevertheless, the crisis has allowed international 
institutions to regain a certain role, mainly with the countries of the East, in a more balanced and 
positive way. IMF regains strong legitimacy in 2009 following the G20, its mandate being 
strengthened: mission in-depth monitoring, increased resources, new more flexible form of 
credit, in order to 'positively' aid, not to stigmatize borrowers and rebalance relations with 
countries emerging. The IMF promises to move quickly to reform voting rights, so much 
criticized by emerging countries. He granted 17 financial support between November 2008 and 
June 2009, for a amount equivalent to $ 150 billion. The new flexible credit facility Colombia ($ 
10 billion, May 11, 2009), Poland ($ 20 billion, May 6, 2009) and Mexico ($ 47 billion, April 17, 
2009). His goal is to prevent crises. It can be allocated in one disbursement and is not conditional 
on the implementation of specific measures in countries, great differences with traditional credit 
facilities. 
On the other hand, in order to stay away from the IMF, Japan, China, South Korea and ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) increased the allocation of the reserve pool, created in 
2000, from $ 80 billion to $ 120 billion in December 2008, to manage the balance of payments 
imbalances, and organized foreign exchange, of which Korea has benefited greatly to stem the 
sharp fall of the won (Kirrane 2018).. This reflects the strong desire for independence and 
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cooperation Asia region. If the disturbances of the crisis in emerging countries are temporary, 
these will have again demonstrated their economic strength. If these disruptions last, the business 
cycle of the emerging countries will be strongly impacted as well as global growth. 
In the deregulated global financial and commercial sphere, the countries are all interconnected. 
Capital of foreign investors have entered massively into emerging countries until 2007 and some 
emerging market companies have already invested in those industrialized countries. In addition, 
US and European imports come partly from emerging countries. Slowdown industrialized 
countries, of their imports, penalizes exports from emerging countries, hence their economic 
growth. 
Following the crisis, the depreciation of the currencies of some emerging countries penalizes the 
competitiveness of other emerging countries, whose growth will decrease by ricochet. In 
addition, via the reorganization of portfolios to offset their losses in the United States and 
Europe, investors and the banks withdraw their capital. These are the canals commercial and 
financial transmission of a crisis to others savings. Will this crisis be considered a common 
shock? In the sense of Masson (1999) for merging economies? Probably, but we will have to 
wait for additional data for test this econometrically. On the other hand, the crises in Asia in 
1997-1998 were not triggered by common shocks (Cartapanis, 
Dropsy and Mametz, 2002; Brana and Lahet, 2005). In the literature traditional, the common 
shock, exogenous to emerging countries, which triggers exchange crises or simultaneous 
economic shocks in emerging economies, is in fact akin to push factors, outside the emerging 
countries, therefore endogenous to the industrialized countries, that push the capital of foreign 
investors into the economies emerging. These are overall interest rates and growth industrialized 
countries. The first econometric studies on the subject (like Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart, 
1993, Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi, 1998) show that a recession in the United States pushes 
capital towards emerging countries, to take advantage of more favorable elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, Jeanneau and Micu (2002) find a positive correlation between the evolution of the 
economic cycle of industrialized countries and the flow of capital (bank loans) invested by them 
in emerging countries. That means economic growth strong in investor countries pushes capital 
flows into emerging countries: investors, having made more profits in their activities, have cash 
to invest, especially in emerging markets where the risk / return combination provides 
opportunities. Of same, Cartapanis (2004) indicates that strong growth and liquidity 
industrialized countries have played an important and pro-cyclical role in the size of capital 
movements to emerging countries in 1986-2000. Conversely, this would imply that a recession in 
the countries industrialized countries would slow investments in emerging countries. 
Beyond financial links, to talk about coupling or decoupling between industrialized and 
emerging countries, there is a need to focus more on the evolution of the business cycle of 
emerging countries. Are the financial links result in stronger correlations between cycles of 
activity? If American and European recessions lead to those of the emerging countries, one will 
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speak then of coupling of the real cycles. Yes they have no impact, or just a minor impact, we 
can then talk about decoupling in an interconnection environment financial. 
For the first half of 2008, the BIS (2008) speaks of an inflection more moderate growth in the 
emerging countries than in the industrialized countries. Kose, Otrok and Prasad (2008) show 
that, on the period 1960-2005, there was a convergence of economic  (production, consumption, 
investment) among the group "industrialized countries", and also among the countries of the 
group "country but at the same time, a divergence of economic cycles between these two groups 
of countries. In fact, the study highlights the emergence of a cycle specific to each category of 
country. Authors remain cautious and indicate, in the current context of the crisis, that their study 
is not an unqualified adherence to the decoupling hypothesis, it all depends on the duration and 
severity of the recession in the countries industrialized countries: this is the difficulty of 
forecasts. Faure (2009) invalidates the thesis of the decoupling of business cycles, due to 
decreases in industrial production and exports from emerging countries that have been perfectly 
synchronous with the decreases in imports developed, and of the same magnitude, but it revives 
the thesis of decoupling between emerging and industrialized countries, due to the (BIS, 2009) of 
equity markets in emerging countries, following a decline in risk premiums (country financial 
systems emerging markets) and the recovery in the price of raw materials (export earnings for 
some emerging countries). 
Nevertheless, the first effects of economic recovery plans in emerging countries and financial aid 
from the IMF, or before cycles the announcement of these plans, as well as the mitigation of 
financial difficulties in industrialized countries encouraged the return of in emerging countries, 
which ultimately remained quite healthy economically despite the impact of the crisis. 
Despite the slowdown in the evolution of PPP GDP for the emerging Asia zone, the gap with the 
evolution of the GDP of the advanced countries is not reduced. This seems to be a sign of a 
certain decoupling, in any case of a dynamics peculiar to Asian countries. But we must remain 
cautious and a step back is still necessary concerning the current crisis period. 
 The IMF revised upwards its projections for emerging Asia, considering the improved prospects 
for growth of China and India, which is due to recovery plans macroeconomic conditions and 
expectations of a return faster than expected capital flows. Gross inflows of capital In 2009, the 
private sector is estimated in emerging Asia at 10% of GDP of the zone (FDI, equities and bank 
loans) and Latin America to 2.5% of the region's GDP (FDI and bank loans) (BIS, 2009). By 
elsewhere, the services sector in these countries, particularly in China, August 2009-September 
2009, explodes and appears as a relay of growth relative to industrial production. For America 
Latin America, the IMF projections were lowered for 2009, slightly increased for 2010 due to the 
expected impact of higher commodity prices. Same evolutions for projections concerning the 
CEEC, still strongly affected by the global crisis in 2009. In 2008, the economic growth of 
emerging countries was strong, especially for Asian countries, even if it is lower to 2007. The 
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projections for 2009 show that the countries Asian would still stand out; in 2010, it would be 
more globally all emerging countries that would regain strong growth. 
The IMF plans to revise upwards its projections for 2010, if risk aversion continued to decline 
and domestic demand large emerging countries rose sharply. Indeed, growth in domestic demand 
in emerging countries densely populated, especially from China, but also at regional level 
emerging markets, has been strong since 2001 and demonstrates the dynamism of two things: 
private consumption of goods and services of a class growing average, whose purchasing power 
sometimes increases quickly than in advanced countries, and gradually accessing credits; and 
investment. This could counterbalance the shortcomings of external drivers of economic growth 
and sustainably support and endogenously the evolution of the GDP of emerging countries. 
To support this economic growth and confront the impacts of the crisis on the real economy, the 
emerging countries quickly had to objective of maintaining private sector financing and 
investment. To close the decline in capital inflows, including loans foreign currency banks, while 
the foreign exchange market was unstable, the emerging countries drew on their reserves of 
foreign exchange to finance the private sector. In addition, the sector banking, healthy, has 
managed to maintain (except in Turkey where it drops, strong rise in China) the level of 
domestic bank credit (BIS, 2009), often helped by the cuts in the key rates and the reserve 
requirement by some central banks. 
Moreover, concerning the external component of growth It should be noted that the share of 
trade with industrialized countries in the total trade of emerging countries decreased by 70% to 
50% in fifteen years, which could be a protection against a crisis in the advanced countries. At 
the same time, the share of intragroup in the total trade of emerging countries has almost 
doubled; 50% of Asia's exports represent trade intrazone. This is lower than the level reached in 
Western Europe (70%) and is at the percentage level of North America. That is to link to the 
existence of regional trade blocs for free trade. 
Nevertheless, the share of intra-regional trade is only 24% Latin America which trades the most 
with advanced countries (nearly 60% -70%) and 12% for the Middle East (WTO, 2008). At the 
aggregate level, the share of intraregional trade, which is mainly an Asian characteristic, was 
maintained between 2000 and 2007 at 33% (total exports of emerging countries), while trade 
extra-regional between emerging regions increased from 15.6% to 20% and that with the 
advanced countries fell from 51.3% to 47% (Faure, 2009), but remains dominant. 
China is the driving force of intra-Asia trade. Between 2001 and 2007, China's exports to 
ASEAN were multiplied by 7.4 and imports from China since ASEAN by 6.5 (Kalasopatan, 
Nicollas and Lelarge, 2007). As soon as the Asian crisis ends, China has moved closer to the 
most affected countries in the zone. In 2010, the zone of ASEAN-China free trade will be 
operational, which will encourage the supply of agricultural products and services by ASEAN. 
But China has also developed its relations with emerging non Asia: Africa, Russia, in particular. 
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More specifically (WTO, 2008), the China's largest trading partner, with respect to merchandise 
exports in 2007, is Asia ($ 521bn), then Europe and North America ($ 264 billion), the 
Community of Independent States (CIS) ($ 48 billion), the Middle East ($ 44 billion), South 
America ($ 39 billion) and finally Africa ($ 37 billion). For India, this is Asia ($ 46 billion), then 
Europe ($ 34 billion), the Middle East ($ 25 billion), North America ($ 22 billion) and finally 
South America ($ 4bn) and the CIS ($ 2bn). For Brazil, the first partner is Europe ($ 43 billion), 
South America ($ 38 billion), North America North ($ 32 billion), Asia ($ 26 billion), Africa ($ 9 
billion) and finally the Middle Orient ($ 6bn) and the CIS ($ 4bn). More broadly, the rise of trade 
South-South (12.5% annual growth over 1985-2005 against 9.8% for North-South trade) is a sign 
of rising power, rebalancing with advanced countries: intra-South trade has represented, in 2005, 
27% of the aggregate GDP of the South against 9% in 1995 and exports from the South to the 
North represented, in 2005, only 17% of southern GDP (Kalasopatan, Nicollas and Lelarge, 
2007). The strength of demand from other emerging regions, including of the Middle East, has 
effectively helped to maintain surpluses in Asia in 2007. South-South FDI is also moving in this 
direction. But even if more than half of Chinese exports are destination of other emerging 
countries and even if the US share in emerging Asian exports declined, this last remains 
important enough for the US recession, according to its duration, penalizes the foreign trade of 
these emerging countries: 10% in Singapore, 18% in Malaysia, 20% in China. 
The least open countries, or diversified exports such as Brazil, could be impacted less by the 
crisis. Is the Chinese recovery, which begins in mid-2009, will be sufficient to revive, on the one 
hand, and relaunch sustainably, on the other hand, trade other emerging countries? In fact, intra-
group trade is some unfavorable aspects. He apparently did not play the role shock absorber of 
global demand in 2008, the heart of the crisis, and would be at the origin of the amplification of 
the shock (Faure, 2009). Furthermore, this intraregional trade, even intrazone emerging 
countries, is specific and remains dependent on the demand of the advanced countries: it is a 
trade of intermediate goods to produce the final good in China and sell it to northern country. If 
the Chinese stimulus plan benefits consumption interior, mostly of low-end goods produced for a 
large share locally, and is a source of economic growth, this does not will not necessarily boost 
imports of intermediate goods used to secure demand for final goods in the North. So the role 
intrazone trade in the economic growth of the countries emerging may be ambiguous. Emerging 
countries that will benefit from the Chinese recovery are rather producers of raw materials. 
Public spending is the other internal component of growth and we can analyze them alongside 
traditional factors "Labor and capital", in abundance in emerging and relatively cheaper than in 
developed countries, and whose productivity and quality are improving (technical progress and R 
& D expenditure, education and training in constant growth, even though the crisis may have to 
curb them and that, in value, it remains lower than advanced; upscaling of production, 
particularly in China), as a factor, this time endogenous, of economic growth. This The concept 
of public capital6 is gaining importance following the numerous recovery plans put in place by 
emerging countries that can (the others use the IMF's aid more directly), as in the case of 
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Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand 
and China, which invest mainly in infrastructure, even though not all plans have the same 
magnitude. Emerging countries have there is room for maneuver because, so far, public 
authorities have been globally under control. China has huge means: $ 585bn support plan equals 
14% of Chinese GDP every year for two years. The effects are already being felt third quarter of 
2009. Infrastructure construction projects have already been advanced. The two main items in 
this plan concern infrastructure (railway, airport, urban electricity) and reconstruction of the 
disaster area by the earthquake in 2008. We also note a significant investment in health and 
education, housing sustainable development and innovation. In February 2009, plans (three plans 
for $ 39 billion) from South Korea are "green" because they provide for infrastructure 
investments low CO2 emissions, making the country the biggest investor of the year in 
sustainable development. Politics macroeconomic policy of emerging countries therefore has a 
crucial role Counter-cyclical to play: Sufficiently support domestic consumption without 
degrading public finances and not provoking inflationary pressures, or capital outflows. The 
result will depend the ability of governments to strike the right balance. 
Finally, to explain this dynamic of sustained growth, would find as growth support elements 
those who have allowed the strong growth phase from 2002 to 2007: the progression of the 
globalization that the crisis cannot interrupt; the rebound in the price of commodities, especially 
for Latin America, although for the moment, it does not fill the decline of more than 30% over 
the period of July 2008 to December 2008; the links that have been strengthened so more 
accentuated between certain emerging countries at the commercial level, but also financially, 
particularly because of South-South flows from sovereign wealth funds (Marin, 2009, for future 
investments CIC in the energy and environment sectors in other emerging countries); and no 
longer the emergence but the maintenance of the China's role in regional and global trade, as 
well as its financial weight: its net creditor position in 2007 was more than 30% of GDP and is 
expected to increase over the next decade by its growth differential, its demography, the fiscal 
stimulus, its financial wealth, its exchange rate regime (Guonan and Haiwen, 2009) and its 
sovereign funds. 
Short-term concerns and recommendations Although forecasts are much higher than projected 
growth for the industrialized world  growth for emerging countries remain below growth average 
savings over 2003-2007 (7%) and 2007 (8.3%). 
In emerging countries, which for some years now has been an objective important unlike before 
1997? In addition, independently negative impacts on economic growth, other concerns appeared 
in 2008 and are still relevant in 2009. 
As we have seen, emerging countries are in fact a heterogeneous asset class: some have a current 
account deficit, others have a current account surplus Ratings, even though they have not 
changed much as a result of the crisis, position countries differently: an equivalent of 8/20 for 
Indonesia, 11/20 for Brazil, 14/20 for Poland and 16/20 for Chile, for example. The notes are 
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also different within the same zone. Political problems are sometimes still present in 2008 
(Thailand, India). 
Some countries have a healthy and resilient banking system (America Latin America, Asia), with 
active banking supervision and many foreign exchange reserves, and others much less. Some 
have a external bank debt in foreign currency stronger than others. Tea the most fragile countries 
for 2008-2009, on the brink of the crisis payment in 2008, are India, Turkey, South Africa and 
most importantly CEECs, where current account deficits are heavy, and more indebtedness 
foreign currency banks (75% of housing loans in Poland are currency, for example). The CEECs 
are still subject to the risk of rationing of foreign creditor banks parent companies of subsidiaries 
or branches located in the CEECs (BIS, 2009). The external banking financing of emerging 
countries, which is largely in foreign currency, and has been penalized, all the that the Basel II 
ratio does not push foreign banks to lend local and long-term currency and that bank credit 
conditions are deteriorated by the banking crisis. Ukraine ($ 16.4 billion) and Hungary ($ 12.5 
billion) are part of countries that appealed in October 2008 to the IMF for a plan for financial 
support with an adjustment program.  
On the other hand, South-East Asia, Brazil, Mexico City, Chile appear to have the fundamentals, 
even though the IMF is forecasting growth negative in 2009 for the most part. A flat must be 
brought to Argentina (declining rating), whose external debt service is still very high, and for 
Korea, including private sector indebtedness is heavy. On the other hand, the political discourse 
has been homogeneous, reactions to the crisis have been varied, a sign of the heterogeneity of 
countries, and could be a factor of weakening the group, even if Regional monetary cooperation 
was organized (Asia). This may also a sign of understanding and control of the situation 
particular of each country. It is clear that one year, the emerging countries had to first deal with 
capital inflows that led to appreciation of their currency and rekindled inflationary tensions late 
2007, then to the reverse evolutions at the end of 2008. Moreover, in Latin America, for 
example, the Brazilian Real depreciated sharply in 2008, while the Argentine peso In October 
2008, In Indonesia, the reserve requirement ratio fell from 3% to 1% dollar deposits. In 
November 2008, China lowered its rates and the reserve requirement ratio; Korea decided to 
Hong Kong plans to create funds, as in France, to provide liquidity to banks. Tea China, India 
and Russia eased restrictions on capital in 2007, Thailand removed them in 2008. China and 
Korea has reduced the mortgage loan / asset value ratio of the October 2008. Capital and 
reserves have been strengthened in India and the loan criteria in Korea in 2008. Finally, Brazil 
adopts measures to boost credit to SMEs .A few other punctual facts also attracted attention as 
early as 2008 and showed the magnitude of the repercussions: the nationalization of the funds 
pension scheme in Argentina to guarantee the security of capital, in November 2008, which 
strongly marked the markets; at first half-year 2008, the closure of 3,000 Chinese SMEs; in 
November 2008, an increase in bad debts of banks, in particular Chinese banks; the increase in 
2009-2010 of deficits following the recovery plans of certain emerging countries (CEEC, but 
also Korea and Malaysia). 
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Since February 2009-March 2009, it seems that emerging countries are entered a period of 
economic and financial stabilization, or even some of them (China, Indonesia). The countries 
Asian people are already receiving capital. But there should not be a return massive volatile 
capital. We know the risk of reversal of capital invested in healthy economies that have 
improved the depth and liquidity of their market. It is important that emerging countries reduce 
their financing relative to the outside, to avoid currency risk and the destabilizing impact of the 
factors push when their evolution is reversed, as well as the redevelopment of portfolios of the 
"financier / common creditor". That's why they must continue to modernize their capital markets 
with the creation of sovereign debt securities in currency national, in the long term, to interest 
national investors (Odonnat and Rahmouni, 2006) and reduce short-term debt and in foreign 
currency. This is the case of Mexico and other countries, such as Brazil, Turkey, Venezuela, 
chose to repay their debts foreign currencies. It is also necessary to increase emissions private 
bondholders to supplement the financing obtained by issue of shares. National institutional 
investors, funds pensions, insurance companies, must also develop their investments so that 
countries are less dependent on brutal non-resident investors. This will better capture abundant 
national savings and to participate in the immense task that take time: reducing global 
imbalances. And in this modernization phase, we should not fall into the error of the excess of 
financial innovations which, as shown by the current crisis and explained it first Schumpeter then 
Minsky, can provoke an increase in systemic illiquidity (Bervas, 2008), when the euphoria phase 
ends and the repayment ability debts incurred are low. Michel Camdessus indicated that crises 
find their origin in the unregulated part of the economy and capital markets. So do not forget to 
regulate when modernizing the functioning of the markets, emphasizing transparency and market 
discipline. 
In parallel, emerging countries should also, upstream, better banking non-financial agents to 
mobilize huge savings of a growing middle class in most economies emerging markets and to 
continue to ensure the quality of the distributed credit. Finally, it is important for emerging 
countries to be less dependent on the demand of the advanced countries: they must strive to find 
a balance between intrazone trade or interregions emerging markets and trade with the North, to 
maintain a clean dynamic and protect against external shocks. Today, dependence on external 
demand from the North could delay recovery in emerging countries and in the world, if that of 
the United States, and more widely advanced countries, was slow and if the Chinese relay did not 
sufficiently lock in the growth of other economies emerging countries that export to China. 
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